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Iranian Angle to Non-Audit Services:
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The purpose of this paper is to show diﬀerent Iranian accountants’ as
well shareholders’ ideas on Non-audit services and their eﬀects on au-
dit independence in Iran. In other words, in this paper the authors
have attempted to deal with this question: does providing non-audit
services by an Iranian auditor impair audit independence? And in or-
der to gather usable data a suitable questionnaire was designed and de-
veloped. The results of this study show that the participants strongly
believe that non-audit services may impair audit independence. It is
interesting to note that, although the auditors oﬀer to clients non-audit
services, they believe that oﬀering such services leads to audit indepen-
dence being questionable. Further, the result reveals that literate par-
ticipants moderately agree that nas has a negative eﬀect on audit in-
dependence, however illiterate participants strongly agree that nas has
a negative aﬀect on audit independence. This paper is the first paper
which includes two groups of participants: the first group is auditors in
general, or we can call them academiciana with pretensions to having
auditing literacy and the second group is non- academician, including
stakeholders who may not have auditing literacy skills. This may useful
for future studies regarding the non-audit service and its eﬀect on audit
independence.
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Introduction
This paper provides some preliminary empirical evidence on the de-
terminants and consequences (impairment of auditor independence) of
Non-Audit Service (nas) provided by auditors in Iran. The requirement
of auditor independence arises from the need to establish the indepen-
dent auditor as an objective and trustworthy arbiter of the fair presenta-
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tion of financial results (Salehi and Nanjegowda 2006; Salehi 2007). In-
deed, Mautz and Sharaf (1964) and Berryman (1974) posit that indepen-
dence is the cornerstone of the audit profession and an essential ingredi-
ent of users’ confidence in financial statements. Since independent audi-
tors occupy a position of trust between the management of the reporting
entity and users of its financial statements, they must be perceived to be
operating independently on the basis of sound auditing standards and
strong ethical principles. Over the years, an extensive literature on the
subject of auditor independence has developed; a focal point of much
of this literature has been to identify those factors which do and do not
impact upon auditor independence. Among all the factors identified in
the researches whichmight threaten the independence of the auditor, the
provision of nas has been the subject of the most heated debate (Can-
ning and Gwilliam 1999). Especially, the collapse of Enron in the us and
the demise of Andersen have generally undermined confidence in the
world’s capital markets. Much of the concern has focused on accounting
and auditing practices, and particularly on the independence of audi-
tors. Auditor independence is fundamental to public confidence in the
audit process and the reliability of auditors’ reports (Salehi and Abedini
2008; Salehi 2008a). The audit report adds value to the financial state-
ments provided by managers (capital seekers) to shareholders (capital
providers) through the independent verification it provides (Johnstone,
Sutton, and Warfiled 2001; Salehi, Mansoury, and Pirayesh 2008). The
audit is not just a benefit to investors. It also reduces the cost of infor-
mation exchange for both sides (Dopuch and Simunic 1982) and ben-
efits management by providing a signaling mechanism to the markets
that the information which management is providing is reliable (Salehi,
Mansouri, and Azar 2009). It has been further argued that the auditors’
liability insurance serves to indemnify investors against losses. So, the au-
ditors must be independent in order to be patrons of the shareholder(s).
However, from recent years on, the external auditing practice has become
questionable just because of proving nas to the same clients.
Before going to the heart of the problem here we are briefly explain
the nature of independence.
Independence
One of the key factors of the auditor’s work is independence, without
independence users of financial statements cannot rely on the auditors’
report (Barzegar and Salehi 2008). In short, the external system of audit,
Managing Global Transitions
Iranian Angle on Non-Audit Services 125
with its final product, the audit opinion, adds credibility to the finan-
cial statements so that users can rely on the information presented and,
as a result, the entire system of financial reporting is enhanced (Sucher
and Maclullich 2004). Furthermore, independence is the core of this sys-
tem. In addition, the concept of audit independence is fuzzy, the rules
governing it are complex and burdensome, and a re-examination is long
overdue (Elliott and Jacabson 1992; Salehi and Azary 2008).
De Angelo (1981) defined auditor independence as the conditioner
probability of reporting a discovered bridge. Arens et al. (1999) defined
‘independence in auditing’ as taking an unbiased viewpoint in the per-
formance of audit tests, the evaluations of the results and the issuance of
audit reports. Independence includes the qualities of integrity, objectiv-
ity and impartiality. Knapp (1985) states the independence from a diﬀer-
ent angle. He views it as ‘the ability to resist client pressure’. According to
Flint (1988) independence, therefore, is not a concept which lends itself
to universal constitution prescription, but one for which the constitu-
tion prescription will depend on what is necessary to satisfy the criteria
of independence in the particular circumstances.
The Independence Standard Board (2000) defines independence as:
Freedom from pressures and other factors that impair, or are perceived
to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise objectivity and integrity
when performing an audit; it is the absence of certain activities and re-
lationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s
willingness to exercise objectivity and integrity when performing an au-
dit.
There are two approaches to audit independence which have com-
monly been referred to as independence of fact and independence of
appearance.
According to Mautz and Sharaf (1964), there are three dimensions of
auditor independence which can minimize or eliminate potential threats
to the auditor’s objectivity:
1. Programming independence includes: freedom from managerial
interference with the audit program; freedom from any interfer-
ence with audit procedures; and freedom from any requirement
for the review of the audit work other than that which normally
accompanies the audit process.
2. Investigative independence encompasses: free access to all records,
procedures, and personnel relevant to the audit; active co-operation
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from management personnel during the audit examination; free-
dom from any management attempt to specify activities to be ex-
amined or to establish the acceptability of evidential matter; and
freedom from personal interests on the part of the auditor leading
to exclusions from or limitations on the audit examination.
3. Reporting independence includes: freedom from any feeling of obli-
gation to modify the impact or significance of reported facts; free-
dom from pressure to exclude significant matters from internal au-
dit reports; avoidance of intentional or unintentional use of am-
biguous language in the statement of facts, opinions, and recom-
mendations and in their interpretations; and freedom from any at-
tempt to overrule the auditor’s judgment as to either facts or opin-
ions in the internal audit report.
The immediate objective of the audit is to improve the reliability of in-
formation used for investment and credit decisions; according to Elliott
and Jacabson (1992) the principles of independence are as follows:
Audit independence improves the cost-eﬀectiveness of the capital
market by reducing the likelihood of material bias by auditors that
can undermine the quality of the audit. Therefore, they play a vi-
tal role in the economic sector. However, some factors may have a
negative eﬀect on independence; these should be identified by pro-
fessionals, and severe action should be taken to reduce such factors.
Factors Aﬀecting Independence
Several situations may impair the auditor’s independence, such as con-
tingent fee arrangements, gifts, auditor’s contact with personnel or op-
erations, nas, outsourcing, opinion shopping, reporting relationships,
and other matters.
Among the factors that aﬀect auditor independence that have been
studied are:
1. The eﬀects of gifts (Pany and Reckers 1988)
2. The purchase discount arrangement (Pany and Reckers 1988)
3. The audit firm size (Shockley 1981; Gul 1989; Salehi 2008b)
4. The provision ofManagement Advisory Services (mas) by the audit
firm (Shockley 1981; Knapp 1985; Gul 1989; Bartlett 1993; Teoh and
Lim 1996; Abu Bakar, Abdul Rahman and Abdul Rashid 2005)
5. The client’s financial condition (Knapp 1985; Gul and Tsui 1992)
6. The nature of conflict issue (Knapp 1985)
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7. The audit firm’s tenure (Shockley 1981; Teoh and Lim 1996)
8. The degree of competition in the audit services market (Knapp 1985;
Gul 1989)
9. The size of the audit fees or relative client size (Gul and Tsui 1992;
Bartlett 1993; Teoh and Lim 1996; Pany and Reckers 1988)
10. The audit committee (Gul 1989; Teoh and Lim 1996; Salehi, Man-
souri, and Azar 2009)
11. Practicing nas by auditors (Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt 1999; Ray-
hunandan, 2003; Salehi and Rostami 2009)
In this paper the authors have only attempted to clarify nas and its
eﬀect on the independence of auditors.
The audit failures that have been reported have led to major criticism
of the auditing profession worldwide by exposing the weaknesses of the
profession in terms of safeguarding shareholders’ and stockholders’ in-
terests (Citron 2003; Gwilliam 2003; Higson 2003; Brandon, Crabtree,
and Maher 2004; Cullinan 2004; Fearnley and Beattie 2004; Karnishnan
and Levine 2004; Mahadevaswamy and Salehi 2008; Salehi and Rostami
2009); thus some of this criticism arose from nas practices by auditors
which are the subject of this survey.
non-audit services
nas may be any services other than audit provided to an audit client by
an incumbent auditor. As the demand for business expert services grew
over the late 20th century, public accounting firms expanded the scope of
their services to include corporate and individual tax planning, internal
audit outsourcing, and consulting related to mergers and acquisitions,
information systems, and human resources. Recent concerns about au-
ditor independence have focused on the provision of nas to audit clients.
It is found that auditors believe that the auditors’ work would be used
as a guide for investment, valuation of companies, and in predicting
bankruptcy; furthermore, the third party felt that there is a strong rela-
tionship between the reliability of the auditor’s work and the investment
decision. Also the auditor’s work facilitates the process of economic de-
velopment through the presentation of reliable information concerning
the financial position of the companies (Wahdan et al. 2005). Today’s
public accounting firms have undergone dramatic changes in the last 25
years. Over the last decade the proportion of the revenue of large pub-
lic accounting firms which derived from providing nas grew from 12
percent to 32 percent (Public Oversight Board 2000), suggesting that the
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economic bond between auditors and their clients strengthened over this
time as auditors delivered more consulting-oriented services to their au-
dit clients.
Based on the amounts reported in the Public Accounting Report, last
year audit fees for the top seven accounting firms were approximately
usd 9.5 billion. These accounting firms audited over 80 percent of all
registrants, and virtually every company with a large market capitaliza-
tion. What’s more, the audit and accounting fees of the largest account-
ing firms, as a percentage of their revenue, has decreased significantly
from 70 percent of total revenue in 1976 for the Big Eight to 34 percent of
total revenue for the same firms in 1998 (Ashbaugh 2004). Given the shift
in revenue streams of public accounting firms, it is important to discuss
the services that audit firms provide. An accountant becomes a Certified
Public Accountant (cpa) to engage in attestation services, that is, con-
duct audits. Scholars are concerned that benefits either from cost sav-
ings, or from fees revenue increases, can strengthen the economic bond
between auditors and their clients, which can further threaten auditor
independence.
Therefore, the main question that arises when auditors provide or
could provide both audit and nas is whether the auditors are able to
conduct their audits impartially, without being concerned about losing
or failing to gain additional services, and without considering the sub-
sequent economic implications for the audit firm (Lee 1993). Auditors
seek to provide nas because of the considerable economies of scope that
ensue, i.e. cost savings that arise when both types of service are provided
by the same firm. These economies of scope are of two types: knowl-
edge spillovers that originate in the transfer of information and knowl-
edge, and contractual economies that arise from making better use of
assets and/or safeguards already developed when contracting and ensur-
ing quality in auditing.
Thus far, globalization in accounting and assurance service has also
created the multi disciplinary nature of large audit firms (Brierley and
Gwilliam 2003). These multi disciplinary firms oﬀer audit and nas to
audit clients, and this has become one of the major concerns regard-
ing the potential auditor independence dilemma (Quick and Rasmussen
2005).
The prohibition of specified non-audit services is predicated on three
basic principles:
• an auditor cannot function in the role of management,
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• an auditor cannot audit its own work, and
• an auditor cannot serve in an advocacy role for its client.
The range of services now oﬀered by the audit firms to both the pub-
lic and private sector is wide. This may summarized as follows (Salehi,
Mansouri, and Pirayesh 2009):
• designing system, and it,
• training,
• services for payroll,
• risk management advice,
• taxation, including tax compliance and tax planning advice,
• corporate recovery and insolvency,
• forensic and litigation support,
• mergers and acquisitions services,
• transaction support and follow up,
• public oﬀering,
• recruitment and human resources, and
• portfolio monitoring.
Provision of some of these services may pose a real threat to indepen-
dence in the case of audit client. The principal threats which arise from
the provision of non-audit services are:
• Self interest: the increase in economical benefit dependence.
• Self review: taking management decisions and auditing one’s work.
Advocacy: acting for the client’s management in adversarial circum-
stances.
• Familiarity: becoming too close to the client’s management through
the range of services oﬀered.
In the United States, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 implemented a
ban on nine non-audit services which are as below:
1. Bookkeeping and other services related to the audit client’s account-
ing records or financial statements
2. Financial information systems design and implementation
3. Appraisal or valuation services and fairness opinions
4. Actuarial services
5. Internal audit services
6. Management functions
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7. Human resources plan
8. Broker-dealer services
9. Legal services
However, in some countries external auditors still practise nas which
it caused to dependence auditors.
Review of the Literature
After several scandals of international and national dimensions, espe-
cially after the Enron Collapse, professionals, academics, and researchers
have focused on non-audit services. However, many writers maintain
that the nas impair objectivity, as well as independence, whereas others
argue that there exists no association between nas and audit quality. In
short, the findings of prior studies on impacts of nas on audit quality are
negative, positive, or have no eﬀects. In a nutshell the various researchers
came to three diﬀerent conclusions about the eﬀect of nas on audit in-
dependence. Below, we briefly explain three diﬀerent schools of nas.
studies indicating negative effect of nas
on auditor independence
Several prior studies suggest that nas has negative eﬀects on auditor
practices and auditor independence. Antle (1984) considers auditor in-
dependence to be an auditor’s freedom from management influence as
desired by the company’s owners. He considered that since management
controls the auditor’s fee, an auditor can ignore independence in favor
of management, unless a control mechanism is implemented.
A survey carried out by Wines (1994) suggests that auditors receiving
nas fees are less likely to qualify their opinion than auditors who do not
receive such fees, based on his empirical analysis of audit report issued
between 1980 and 1989 by 76 companies publicity listed on the Australian
stock exchange. He found that auditors of companies with clean opin-
ions received a higher proportion of non audit fees than did auditors
of companies with at least one qualification. In relation to management
advisory services (mas), Gul and Tsui (1992) conducted a survey, also
using Australian companies, indicating that provision of management
advisory services aﬀects the informativeness of earnings. They found ev-
idence that the explanatory power of earnings for returns is less for firms
that provide mas. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) found empiri-
cally that levels of discretionary accruals are higher for firms whose au-
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ditors provided nas than for firms whose auditors do not provide such
services.
According to Beeler and Hunton (2002) contingent economic rents,
such as potential non-audit revenue, increase unintentional bias in the
judgments of auditors. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) and Larcker
and Richardson (2004) found some evidence of potential links between
nas and earnings management measures. Beck, Frecka, and Solomon
(1988) argue that non-audit fees further increase the client-auditor bond
by increasing the portion of the audit firm that is delivered from serving
a client.
Hackenbrack and Elms (2002) revisit the asr 250 fee disclosures and
find a negative association between stock returns and non-audit fees for
sample companies with the highest ratio of non-audit fees. Brandon,
Crabtree, and Maher (2004), opponents to the Joint provision of audit
and nas, claimed that auditors would not perform their audit services
objectively and joint provision would impair perceived independence.
Mitchel et al. (1993) believed that the joint provision of audit and nas
to audit clients would cause unfair competition due to the use of audit
services to the same client.
studies indicating no effect of nas on auditors’
independence
Several prior studies suggest that nas has no eﬀects on auditor prac-
tices and auditor independence. Glezen and Millar (1985); Corless and
Parker (1987); Wines (1994); and Kinney, Palmrose, and Schoolz (2004)
did not find systematic evidence showing that auditors violate their inde-
pendence as a result of clients purchasing relatively more nas. According
to Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) several studies have re-examined
the negative eﬀects of nas on audit quality, and found in their study that
nas has no eﬀect on auditors’ independence. Abdel-Khalik (1990) re-
ported no significant diﬀerence in audit fees between clients purchasing
audit service only and those purchasing both audit and nas.
Using Discretionary Accruals (da) as a surrogate for auditor objectiv-
ity, Reynolds, Deis, and Francis (2004) find no association between nas
and da, and conclude that little evidence exists supporting the negative
eﬀects of nas on auditor’s objectivity.
O’Keefe, Simunic, and Stein (1994) extended Davis, Ricchiute, and
Trompeter (1993), using disaggregated labor hours by rank (Partner,
Manager, senior and staﬀ) for clients of the Big Six firms in 1989, and
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using also the percentage of tax fees to audit fees and the percentage
of management consulting fees to audit fees as independent variables.
They fail to find evidence that audit eﬀort is reduced in a joint pro-
vision scenario. Palmrose (1999) found that less than one percent of
auditor litigation has nas as part of the basis on which the lawsuits are
founded. Jenkins and Krawczyk (2001) asked 83 Big Five and 139 Non-
Big Five accounting professionals and 101 investor participants to rate
their perceptions of auditor independence, integrity, and objectivity for
two scenarios in which an auditor provides neither nas to one firm,
nor a nominal amount of nas (3 percent of total client revenues) nor a
material amount of nas (40 percent) to another. Although they found
investors’ perceptions of independence and decisions on whether or not
to invest were not aﬀected by either level of non-audit service provision.
Investors (non-big-professionals) did consider the 40 percent level of
nas to be significant in their investment decisions.
Sori (2006) investigated the perception of Malaysian auditors, loan of-
ficers and senior managers of public listed companies on the eﬀect of
joint provision of audit and nas on auditor independence. The majority
of the responses agreed with the provision of nas to audit client by the
audit engagement team. Chung and Kallapur (2003) report no statisti-
cally significant association between abnormal accruals and the ratio of
client fees to total audit firm fees.
studies indicating the positive effect of nas on
auditors’ independence
Several prior studies suggest that nas has positive eﬀects on auditor
practices and auditor independence. Gul (1989) studied the perceptions
of bankers in New Zealand and found that the eﬀect of provision of nas
was significantly and positively associated with auditor independence.
In Malaysia, Gul and Yap (1984) reported that nas provision increased
their confidence in auditor independence. Arruanda (1999) pointed out
that joint provision of audit and nas would reduce overall cost, raise the
technical quality of auditing, and enhance competition. This would ul-
timately increase auditor independence. Carlton and Perloﬀ (2005) em-
phasize that the outcome is a more eﬃcient allocation of scarce resources
without the need to duplicate eﬀorts to recreate the required input. Kin-
ney, Palmrose, and Schoolz (2004) noted that knowledge of a client’s in-
formation system and tax accounting could spill over to the audit, im-
prove the information available to the auditor and thus improve audit
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quality, which in turn would increase the probability that problems are
discovered.
Auditor’s concern for reputation (Dopuch and Simunic 1982) and le-
gal liability (Palmrose 1988; Shu 2000) should drive auditors to maintain
their independence. Larcker and Richardson (2004) also document the
relation between the level of nas fees and accrual, especially for firms
with weak governance. Their results suggest that auditors of firms that
purchase large nas are less likely to allow the firm to make choices that
lead to large abnormal accruals. They interpret their findings as suggest-
ing that auditors working for firms with weak governance may play a
more important role in the governance process in limiting choices of ab-
normal accruals and that enhanced knowledge through nas has a merely
incremental positive eﬀect on audit quality.
Ghosh, Kallapur, and Moon (2006) studied 8940 firm-years for obser-
vation over the (2000–2002) period and found that the nas fees ratio
(ratio of nas to total fees from the given clients) is negatively associ-
ated with Earning Response Coeﬃcients (erc). Sharama (2006) studied
the impact of audit providing nas and audit-firm tenure on audit eﬃci-
ency.
He was opposed to restricting regulations on the joint provision of au-
dit and nas. His studies provided evidence that demonstrates an increase
in the amount of the provision of nas, as a result of which the audit
lag is reduced. He also provides evidence demonstrating that extended
audit-firm tenure reduces audit lag, while shorter audit-firm tenure in-
creases audit lag. Gore, Pope, and Singh (2001) report a positive associa-
tion between the provision of non-audit services and earnings manage-
ment in uk companies, suggesting that auditors’ reporting standards are
aﬀected by whether the auditor also provides non-audit services to the
audit client. Lennox (1999) suggests that nas increases auditors’ knowl-
edge on clients as well as the probability of discovering problems. Their
empirical data, collected from uk firms, show a significant, though weak,
positive relationship between nas fees and auditors, a surrogate for audit
quality.
Motivation of the Study
Companies currently demand a broad set of nas (Wallman 1996). cpa
firms are responding by oﬀering such varied services as investment bank-
ing, strategic management planning, human resource planning, com-
puter hardware and software installation, and internal audit outsourc-
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ing services (Berton 1995; aicpa 1997). Growth in the revenues earned
from these services has been significant. In constant 1999 dollars, nas
fees grew from usd 2.8 billion in 1990 to usd 15.7 billion in 1999 – an
increase of over 460 percent (Antle 2000).
One of themajor public concerns which have emerged from the Enron
collapse has been the extent to which audit firms are providing nas to
their audit clients.
Much of the current publicly expressed concern about the integrity
of auditors and the influence of nas on auditor independence is based
on opinion and assertion relating principally to the current causes, and
observers generally are not looking beyond these cases. Further, the Sar-
banes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibited auditing firms from providing cer-
tain nas to audit clients and left open the possibility that other currently
non-prohibited services could also be banned. However, Iranian legisla-
tors still do not mandate these rules to the Iranian environment (Salehi
2008b). Further, with regard to review of the literature, it is known that
the researchers did not come to the same conclusion, in other words
they came to three divergent conclusions. So, in this study, we investi-
gate whether provision of nas has a positive aﬀect, a negative eﬀect or
no eﬀect on audit independence.
ResearchMethodology
According to the above literature the objective of this study is to examine
the reaction of auditors, and shareholders regarding nas and consulting
services provided by the auditors to the same clients in Iran. In order to
provide an accurate answer to this question, the authors have designed
and developed a questionnaire based on the method used by previous
researchers (Jenkins and Krawczyk 2001; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson
2002; Brandon, Crabtree, and Maher 2004; Krishnan and Levine 2004).
In order to find an accurate answer to the research question, the authors
have designed and developed a questionnaire which it is stable for gather-
ing useful data. Our selected method of investigation is a questionnaire,
for three reasons. First, since it is acknowledged that current theory is not
well specified in Iran, the general objective of this study is to incorporate
qualitative behavioural factors concerning audit independence into the
research design, in order to assess the relative influence of each factor
type. This necessitated the use of a direct method. Second, other spe-
cific objectives necessitate the use of direct methods to elicit non-public
information. Finally, closed-form questions can be identified from the
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extant auditor choice literature. The research instrument was designed
with close reference to the literature on questionnaire design. The ques-
tionnaire contains two parts, namely (a) bio-data, and (b) the section in-
cluding several questions regarding the rejection/acceptance level of nas
by participants in Iran. The questionnaire was designed on the bases of
the Likert spectrum, and all participants were requested to determine the
degree of agreement or disagreement with each question by assessing the
degree of disagreement and agreement, using the range of integer num-
bers from –2 to 2, where –2 represents high disagreement and 2 repre-
sents high agreement with the hypotheses, while zero represents none of
them (they graded corneal staining using a –2 to 2 scale, where –2 means
highly agreeing, –1 means agreeing, 0 = none, 1 means disagreeing and 2
means highly disagreeing). The questionnaires were distributed among
the respondents from the 1 June to 30 October 2008.
The Cronbach’s Alpha coeﬃcient, used to assess reliability of the ques-
tionnaire, was 0.946 for the final questionnaire.
On the bases of important factors we postulated three hypotheses as
follow:
h1 Presenting bookkeeping services by auditors to the same clients has a
negative eﬀect on audit independence.
h2 Presenting managerial consultancy services to the same clients has a
negative eﬀect on audit independence.
h3 A large amount of audit fees has a negative eﬀect on audit indepen-
dence.
Results of the Study
Regarding the data analyses, at first we wanted to know from the all par-
ticipants’ views of nas, which kinds of eﬀects they have on audit in-
dependence, so the Binomial Test will be used to assess how many of
the participants accept the eﬀects of independent factors on dependent
ones. Then the anova (Friedman) Test will be conducted at this stage. In
the last part the statistical population are sub-divided into two groups,
namely: the first group was those have accounting and auditing literacy
skills which, according to table 1, amounted to 2009 participants, and the
second group including those participants who do not have accounting
and auditing literacy skills (142 participants). In this stage the authors
want to know if there are any diﬀerences between the literate group and
the illiterate one. So, Mann-U Whitney will be employed in this stage.
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table 1 Bio-data of participants
Item Work’s field Frequency Percent
Academic degrees Accounting and Auditing 2009 93.39
Other 142 6.61
Total 2151 100.00
Job position Accountants 825 38.35
Internal auditor 741 34.48
Financial Management 123 5.72
Financial analyst 144 6.68
Stockholders 318 14.77
Total 2151 100.00
Results: In total, out of 2450 questionnaires which were distributed
among the participants, 87 percent of respondents completed them (2151
questionnaires were completed). Out of 1450 participants, 2009 partici-
pants had accounting knowledge (93.39 percent); the remaining 142 par-
ticipants (6.61 percent) had no accounting knowledge. To conclude: the
majority of participants had accounting and auditing knowledge.
Out of 2151 participants, 2009 were accountants (93.39 percent), 741
were internal auditors (34.48 percent), 123 were financial managements
(5.72 percent), 144 were financial experts (6.68 percent), and 318 were
stockholders. The demographic characteristics of participants are sum-
marized in table 1.
First the binomial test was conducted to assess how many of the par-
ticipants accept the eﬀects of independent factors on dependent ones.
For this purpose we divided participants into two groups including those
agreeing and disagreeing with hypotheses. The results revealed that 1399
participants (65.04 percent) agreed that presenting bookkeeping services
by auditors to the same clients have a negative eﬀect on audit indepen-
dence, therefore the first hypothesis is significantly confirmed (p < 0.05).
The mean degree of agreement for this hypothesis was 0.498 (sd = 0121,
95 percent of confidence interval from 0.32 to 0.56). The results also show
that 1676 participants (77.92 percent) agreed that presenting managerial
consultancy services to the same clients has a negative eﬀect on audit
independence. As shown by the results, this hypothesis is accepted (h2)
and the mean degree of agreement for this hypothesis was 0.244 (sd =
0.161, 95 percent of confidence interval from 0.182 to 0.323).
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table 2 Dependent variable eﬀect on detecting distortions and test result by
binomial test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
h1 (bookkeeping) Disagreeing 452 0.21 0.5 0.00 Confirmed
Agreeing 1399 0.79
Total 2151 1.00
h2 (manag. cons.) Disagreeing 475 0.22 0.5 0.00 Confirmed
Agreeing 1676 0.80
Total 2151 1.00
h3 (audit fees) Disagreeing 452 0.21 0.5 0.011 Confirmed
Agreeing 1399 0.79
Total 2151 1.00
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) hypothesis, (2) category, (3) frequency, (4)
observed prop., (5) test prop., (6) asymp. sig., (7) results.
table 3 Mean degree of participants’ agreement or disagreement and other statistics
Independent variable Mean degree Standard deviation 95% of conf. int.
Bookkeeping 0.498 0.121 0.32–0.51
Managerial consultancy 0.241 0161 0.182–323
Audit fees 0.185 0.041 0.112–0.255
notes Positive numbers represent themean degree of agreement, while negative num-
bers represent the mean degree of disagreement.
Regarding the third hypothesis, the results reveals that the majority
of participants confirmed that a large amount of audit fees has a nega-
tive eﬀect on audit independence (h3); 1399 participants (65.04 percent)
agreed with the third hypothesis, thus this hypothesis is also significantly
confirmed (p < 0.05). The mean degree of agreement was 0.185 (sd =
0.0.41. 95 percent of confidence interval from 0.112 to 0.255).
The result of testing the hypotheses by the binomial test is shown in
table 2.
Regarding those participants requested to determine the degree of
agreement or disagreement with the question by the Likert Spectrum,
table 3 represents the mean degree of agreement or disagreement accord-
ing to their ideas and other statistics. The competency of auditors has the
most eﬀect on detecting important distortion by the auditor in order to
improve audit independence.
The dependent variables were compared in their eﬀects on auditor in-
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table 4 Results of the Mann-Whitney U-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
h1 (bookkeeping ) alp 2.36 0.81 –0.24 –2.578 0.010
aip 2.60 1.142
h2 (manag. cons.) alp 2.50 0.909 –0.51 –5.873 0.000
aip 3.01 1.095
h3 (audit fees) alp 2.46 0.878 –0.62 –6.468 0.000
aip 3.08 1.178
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) hypothesis, (2) respondents, (3) group
statistics: mean, (4) group statistics: std. dev., (5) paired diﬀerences: mean, (6) Mann-
Whitney U-test, (7) Z* test.
dependence by the non-parametric anova (Friedman) Test. The results
showed that three factors do not have significant diﬀerences.
In this part the statistical population are sub-divided into two groups,
namely: the first group was those have accounting and auditing literacy
skills skills, which according to table 1 amounted to 2009 participants,
and the second group included those participants who do not have ac-
counting and auditing literacy skills (142 participants). At this stage the
authors wanted to know whether there are there any diﬀerences between
the literate and the illiterate group? So, Mann-UWhitney is employed at
this stage.
Table 3 indicates that accounting literate participants have a diﬀerent
perception than accounting illiterate participants regarding the first hy-
pothesis (Bookkeeping), in other words, although both groups strongly
agree that nas have a negative eﬀect on audit independence, there is a
gap between the two groups. As table 4 reveals, the mean value of literate
participants stood at 2.36, whereas the mean value of illiterate partic-
ipants stood at 2.60. So, we can conclude that the illiterate participants
strongly agree that proving nas has a more negative eﬀect on audit inde-
pendence. As is shown in the table below, the results of the test confirmed
that there is a gap between illiterate participants and literate participants
on the negative eﬀect of nas on audit independence.
Returning to the second hypothesis above, the table showed that il-
literate participants strongly agreed (mean value 3.01) that managerial
consultancy has a negative eﬀect to audit independence, however, the lit-
erate participants moderately (mean value 2.50) agreed that managerial
consultancy has a negative eﬀect on audit independence. The result of
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the test confirmed that there is a gap between the two groups on this
matter.
Concerning the last hypothesis, the table above showed that the illiter-
ate participants strongly agreed that audit fees have a negative eﬀect on
audit independence, whereas the literate participants moderately agreed
with this statement (mean value (2.46). The results confirmed that in this
statement also there is a gap between the two groups of participants.
Conclusion and Remarks
According the results of this survey, practising nas to the same clients
has strong negative eﬀects on auditor independence. With regard to the
review of the above literature on surveys conducted in several countries,
the same results have been obtained in Iran, where nas has a negative
eﬀect on audit independence. With regard to the results of table 4, we
can conclude that illiterate participants have more negative perceptions
than literate participants. In other words, although both groups agree
that nas has a negative eﬀect on audit independence, the literate par-
ticipants only moderately agree that nas has negative eﬀects on audit
independence. A large gap was found in this area. To close this gap, two
options may available. First, the nas should be banned as in other coun-
tries around the world; and second, illiterate participants sholud bemade
aware of more information related to accounting and auditing. In sum,
around the world in many countries accounting and auditing legislators
have enacted rules and regulations for reducing nas. However, unfortu-
nately in Iran there still are no such regulations and rules regulating the
outcome of such an economical environment in practising nas to the
same clients by the external auditors. Last but not least, it is very inter-
esting to note that the Iran Audit Organisation is the only legislator for
enacting accounting regulations, yet unfortunately, this important and
vital organization oﬀers both audit legal service and nas to clients. In a
nutshell, to improve external auditors’ independence, this organization
should enact new rules in this economical environment. Otherwise, the
same old story such as another Enron collapse may happen to Iranian
corporations.
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